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Even though these cases say the violation of a penal statute is evidence of negligence, the result reached is the same as that reached
by the cases holding such breach to be negligence per se.
Three methods of treating the breach of a penal statute which
has for its purpose the protection of the individual members of the
general public as evidence of negligence have been presented. The
breach has been treated as mere evidence of negligence and no great
weight given to the statutory standard. It has been treated as
prima facie evidence creating a presumption of negligence on the
part of the defendant. And it has been treated as negligence per se,
making the defendant's negligence absolute. Which of these three
methods will best accomplish the purpose of the statutes and at the
same time deal justly with the parties?
It is submitted that, if the breach of penal statutes which have
for their purpose the protection of the individual members of the
general public, is treated as negligence per se by all the courts
instead of a majority of them, the social end for which the statutes
were passed will be substantially and justifiably implemented.
The rule that breach of such penal statutes is negligence per se,
or as a matter of law, does not necessarily render the defendant liable
in every case where he breaches a statute. But where the plaintiff
relies on the breach of a penal statute, to recover he must prove, (1)
that the statute was intended to protect him as an individual;' (2)
that the interest invaded is the interest the act intended to protect;"
7
(3) that the violation is the legal or proximate cause of his injury;
and the defendant may prove contributory negligence to defeat the
claim of the plaintiff.
Thus, we see that while the violation of penal statutes which
have for their purpose the protection of the individual members of
the general public, if treated as negligence per se, would make the
negligence of the defendant conclusive, the defendant would not be
liable every time a statute of this nature was violated. Therefore,
while the social end of protection of the public would thus be attained,
the defendant in such a negligence action would not be dealt with
GLENN DENHAM
unjustly.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-CONCLUSION OF INDICTMENT
' The defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter under
an indictment which did not conclude "against the peace and dignity
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky", as required by Kentucky Constitution, Section 123. No demurrer was made to the indictment
Weimer et al. v. Westmoreland Water Co., - Pa. -, 193 Atl. 665
(1937).
'Falk v. Finkelman, 268 Mass. 89, 168 N. E. 89 (1929).
"8 Dunbar v. Olivieri, 97 Colo. 381, 50 Pac. (2d) 64 (1935).
158 So. 408
La. -,
'Hataway
v. F. Strauss & Son, Inc., (1935).
8
" Patton v. Pa. R. Co., 136 Ohio St. 159, 24 N. E. (2d) 597 (1939).
'Kentucky Constitution Sec. 123: "The style of process shall be,
'The Commonwealth of Kentucky.' All prosecutions shall be carried
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and its defectiveness was not a ground for the motion for a new
trial. The question of the defective indictment was first raised on
appeal. In reversing the conviction the court said: "It is, therefore,
apparent that the indictment in this case was wholly insufficient,
even to the extent of being void and when so it is the duty of the
court, passing upon the validity of a trial thereunder, to take cognizance of the fatal defect at any and all stages of the proceeding,
and render its judgment accordingly. Couch v. Commonwealth, 281
Ky. 543, 136 S. W. (2d) 781, 784 (1940).
At Common law it was necessary that an indictment for an
offense should conclude "against the peace of the king."' In this
country today where the constitution of a state makes no provision
for the conclusion of an indictment, but there is only a statute prescribing the specific conclusion, the omission of the conclusion may
not be a ground for quashing the indictment or finding that it is fatally defective 2 Where the conclusion is required by statute it is treated
as a matter of form and if the indictment is otherwise definaite and
clear and there is no danger that the defendant may be subject to a
new prosecution upon the same facts the conclusion is treated as
immaterial and the indictment is allowed to stand.4
Where there is a constitutional provision prescribing the formal
conclusion of an indictment, however, it has been uniformly held that
this requirement is mandatory and that the indictment is fatally defective if it does not so conclude 2 Some states have gone so far as to
hold an indictment bad when it concluded "against the peace and
dignity of state" whereas the Constitution required that it conclude
"against the peace and dignity of the state."' This has been recognized
as an unreasonable result, however, and it is generally held that a
literal transcript of the required conclusion is not necessary but that a
substantial compliance with the form is sufficient.'
The writer has been unable to find but one case upholding an
information which did not carry the formal conclusion required by
on in the name and by the authority of the 'Commonwealth of Kentucky',
2 and conclude against the peace and dignity of the same."
Clark, Criminal Procedure (2nd ed. 1918) 356.
' Shiver v. State, 41 Fla. 630, 27 So. 36 (1899); State v. Schilling,
14 Iowa 455 (1862); State v. Kirkham, 104 N. C. 911, 10 S. E. 312
(1889).
' Shiver v. State, 41 Fla. 630, 27 So. 36 (1899).
'Fowler v. State, 155 Ala. 21, 45 So. 913 (1908); Cagle v. State,
151 Ala. 84, 44 So. 381 (1907); State v. Froelich, 316 Ill. 77, 146 N. E.
733 (1925); Clingan v. State, 135 Miss. 621, 100 So. 185 (1924); State
v. Warner, 220 Mo. 23, 119 S. W. 399 (1909); State v. Lopez, 19 Mo.
254 (1853); Revill v. State, 87 Tex. Cr. R. 1, 218 S. W. 1004 (1920);
Commonwealth v. Carney, 4 Grat. 546 (Va. 1847); Williams v. State,
27 Wis. 402 (1871).
'State v. Warner, 220 Mo. 23, 119 S. W. 399 (1909); State v.
Campbell, 210 Mo. 202, 109 S. W. 706 (1908); Anderson v. The State,
5 Ark.
444 (1843).
7
State v. Adkins, 284 Mo. 680, 225 S. W. 981 (1920); State v.
Kean, 10 N. H. 347, 34 Am. Dec. 162 (1839).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the constitution

The constitution of Colorado contained a provision

substantially the same as Section 123 of the Kentucky Constitution.
In holding the information good the court stated that the phrase

"against the peace and dignity of the state" was a mere legal con-

clusion which did not enter into that part of the information which
charged the offense. The defect should have been attacked by motion
to quash or in arrest of judgment instead of in a collateral attack by

habeas corpus.

The dissenting opinion in this case, however, sharply

points out:
"In one sense the constitutional requirement may be matter
of form. Nevertheless, by virtue of the fact that it is a part of
the constitution, it is likewise matter of substance. Courts, which
are creatures of the Constitution and the law thereunder, have no
authority to dispense with that which the constitution requires.
For if it be once held that courts can dispense with any portion
of the constitutional requirements, then there is no limit upon
the power of the courts in that respect. They may dispense with
the entire constitution."v
The reasoning of this court in the majority opinion has not been
followed and it is the overwhelming weight of authority that a constitutional provision prescribing the words of conclusion of the indictment is mandatory and an indictment must conclude with those words
0
or be insufficient.
It is the opinion of the writer that the result of this rule, while
unavoidable if constitutions are to be given their traditional respect
and integrity, is objectionable from a practical point of view. Many
cases are reversed on the sole ground that the indictment did not
conclude with the conclusion prescribed by the constitution. In the
principal case the court says:
"From what has been said it is apparent that the prosecution
was and is free from reversible error, except for the fact that the
indictment is fatally defective for the reason pointed out, and
which was not waived by the defendant failing to call attention
of the trial court to it.""
I Chemgas v. Tynan, 51 Colo. 35, 116 Pac. 1045 (1911); (Dictum)
Commonwealth v. Paxton, 14 Phila. 665 (1879). In this case there
were two counts to the indictment. The first did not conclude
"against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania," but the second count did so conclude. The indictment was
held sufficient but this result would have been reached where the
constitutional form is mandatory and at least a substantial compliance is absolutely necessary for there the prescribed conclusion at the
end of the indictment is sufficient without concluding each count.
In this case, however, the court said every indictment has matters
which are merely form and those which are substance; that words
of conclusion are matters of form and that the constitution did not
change this but they remained no less matters of form.
Chemgas v. Tynan, 51 Colo. 35, 116 Pac. 1045, 1048 (1911).
See cases cited Supra note 5.
Couch v. Commonwealth, 281 Ky. 543, 136 S. W. (2d) 781, 784
(1940).
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The trial was a complete nullity and the state was put to the
necessity of proceeding de novo from a new indictment by a grand
jury. The state must bear the expense of two complete trials because
of an error which could not have injured or prejudiced the defendant's rights in any conceivable manner.
Fundamentally the conclusion of an indictment is a matter of
form. The words concluding the indictment do not charge the
offense or so describe it that the defendant will be endangered by
another trial upon the same set of facts if the conclusion is omitted.
The courts have said that, by reason of the fact that the constitution
prescribes the conclusion of an indictment, it becomes a matter of
substance. It is hard to see how the constitution can change the
fundamental nature of the conclusion.
The conclusion is not matter of substance but merely a formal
requirement that has passed down from antiquity and has outlived
any usefulness that it might have once had. It is conceivable that
in England at a time when there were a hundred or more crimes
punishable by death that there was some excuse for technicalities
that might mitigate the harshness of the law. This technicality of
the common law has been accepted by us. The constitutions of
many states have merely codified the common law upon this point.
The justification that might have existed for the rule that an indictment was void if it did not carry the conclusion "against the peace
and dignity of the king (state)" has passed away. Our criminal law
is not unreasonably harsh, yet those who commit offenses may still
have the advantage of an archaic technicality. The ends of justice
are defeated and unreasonably delayed because a technicality which
has outlived its justification has been preserved and raised to the
dignity of a matter of substance by a constitutional provision. It is
small wonder that the layman loses respect for the dignity and fairness of the law when an offender may by so frail an excuse avoid the
result of a fair trial.
As this situation cannot be remedied by judicial decision it is
suggested that, by constitutional amendment, or if a time should ever
come for a general revision of the constitution, Section 123 of the Constitution of the State of Kentucky be so changed as to read:
"The style of process shall be, 'The Commonwealth of Kentucky.' All prosecutions shall be carried on in the name and by
the authority of the 'Commonwealth of Kentucky', but it shall not
be necessary to the validity of a prosecution that it should terminate in the words 'against the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth'."
MARY LouisE BARTON

